The number of traffic fatalities reached a peak in many highly motorised countries around 1970. Some previous studies have suggested that the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities was inevitable and did not reflect a change in the underlying trends influencing the number of traffic fatalities. Other studies suggest that trends in traffic growth and fatality rate changed from before to after the turning point. This paper proposes two hypotheses about the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities. One hypothesis is that the long-term trends in traffic growth and fatality rate were the same before and after the turning point. The other hypothesis is
that the long-term trends in traffic growth and fatality rate were different before and after the turning point was reached, in particular that the annual percentage decline in fatality rate became greater after the turning point than before. Such a change would suggest that road safety policy became more effective. Analysis of data for six countries (Denmark, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United States) lends stronger support to the latter hypothesis than to the former. The lesson for policy makers, in particular in countries where the number of traffic fatalities is still growing, is that they should not expect a turning point to be reached without policy interventions.
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PROBLEM
The long-term development in the number of traffic fatalities is very similar in many highly motorised countries. The number of fatalities increased almost without interruption from about 1945 until about 1970. After 1970, there has been a reduction in the number of traffic fatalities, in some countries by 70-80 percent. Figure 1 shows this development for six highly motorised countries that are included in the study reported in this paper.
Figure 1 about here
The absolute number of traffic fatalities varies enormously between countries; Figure   1 therefore shows relative numbers to enable comparison between countries. The general shape of the curves in Figure 1 is similar for all countries, although both the rate of increase before the peak and the rate of decline after it clearly differ between countries. There are two hypotheses about why the number of traffic fatalities stopped increasing and started to decline. One hypothesis is that the underlying trends that determine the number of traffic fatalities, in particular annual changes in traffic volume and fatality rate (fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres), changed around the time when the peak in the number of traffic fatalities was reached. More specifically, traffic growth may have slowed down and fatality rate started to decline more rapidly.
The other hypothesis, originally put forward by Oppe (1989 , is that the turning point in the number of fatalities was simply a mathematical necessity, following from stable underlying trends in traffic growth and fatality rate. This hypothesis is explained in greater detail in section 2 of the paper. I:\SM-AVD\3398 Kjerne 21\Artikkelarkiv 2013-\Elvik_10.1016_j.aap.2014.10.004.docx 4 Shortly after 1945, a long period of traffic growth started. Early in this period, traffic grew rapidly, sometimes at a rate of more than 10 percent per year. Gradually, traffic growth slowed down. As long as the annual percentage traffic growth is greater than the annual percentage decline in fatality rate (fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres of travel), the number of fatalities will increase. Conversely, if traffic grows more slowly (in percentage terms) than the decline in fatality rate, the number of fatalities will decline. Once the annual percentage traffic growth becomes smaller than the annual decline in fatality rate, a turning point is reached and the number of traffic fatalities starts to decline.
The objective of this paper is to determine whether the trends in traffic growth and fatality rate were different before and after the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities. Models of the trends in traffic growth and fatality rate were fitted to data for the period before the turning point was reached. Model predictions were then made for the period after the turning point. If the models accurately predict the number of traffic fatalities for the period after the turning point, the hypothesis that underlying trends did not change is supported. If the model predictions of the number of traffic fatalities after the turning point are systematically wrong, this supports the hypothesis that the underlying trends did change from before to after the turning point.
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

Models developed by Oppe
Models of the long-term trends in traffic volume and fatality rate in a number of countries were first developed around 1990 by Siem Oppe (1989 . All models that were developed had the same mathematical form. Traffic growth was modelled as a sigmoid curve (logistic function). This means that traffic volume initially grows slowly, then faster, then again slower until a saturation level is reached.
Fatality rate (fatalities per million vehicle kilometres of travel) was modelled by means of an exponential function. This means that fatality rate declines by the same percent each year.
According to the models developed by Oppe, a turning point in the number of traffic fatalities is inevitable. This follows with logical and mathematical necessity from the data and the model specification. The models were fitted to data including the period both before and after the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities.
The models reproduced the history of traffic fatalities with remarkable accuracy for the countries that were included in the second generation of the models (Oppe 1991A, 1991B) . In discussing the models, Oppe stated (1991A): "…The fall in the number of fatalities, noticed in almost all developed countries after a steady increase until 1970, does not need a special explanation. It follows from the combination of the monotonically increasing traffic volumes and the monotonically decreasing fatality rates."
In a similar vein, Hauer (2010) writes: "In truth, a "fatality mountain" such as the French one … characterises all developed countries. … It most likely has nothing to I:\SM-AVD\3398 Kjerne 21\Artikkelarkiv 2013-\Elvik_10.1016_j.aap.2014.10.004.docx 6 do with any action or initiative and is merely the logically necessary consequence of a constantly rising amount of travel and a constantly declining risk of fatality per unit of travel." This interpretation of the models is, at best, imprecise. A turning point cannot arise from the combination of a constant increase in traffic volume and a constant decrease in fatality rate. If, for example, traffic grows at the constant rate of 6 percent per year and fatality rate declines at the constant rate of 5 percent per year, there will never be a turning point, just an endless increase in fatalities.
A closer inspection of model predictions reveals some anomalies. For most of the countries included, the following observations applied:
1. The peak of the curve fitted to the data passed below the actual peak number of fatalities. Thus, the models consistently predicted a lower peak number of fatalities than the actual number.
2. In most countries, the residuals for the last years before the peak were positive, indicating that fatalities grew more rapidly than predicted by the models.
3. In most countries, the residuals after the peak were more often negative than positive, indicating that fatalities dropped more rapidly than predicted by the models.
These anomalies at least suggest that the underlying trends could have been different before and after the turning point. It is therefore fruitful to examine if this is indeed the case. Before presenting the design of a study intended to test this, a review of other relevant studies will be made.
Other studies of long-term trends in road safety
Following the pioneering study by Oppe, a number of other studies have been made to model long-term changes in traffic fatalities. Van Beeck, Borsboom and Mackenbach (2000) fitted log-linear trend lines to data on motor vehicles per 1,000 person-years (indicating exposure) and deaths per motor vehicle (indicating fatality rate) for 21 OECD-countries for the period 1962-1990, dividing the period into six sub-periods. The fitted trend lines did not have the same slope in all sub-periods, thus indicating that neither annual traffic growth nor annual change in fatality rate remained unchanged over time. The model reproduced the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities in the OECD-countries around 1970. Kopits and Cropper (2005) 100,000 inhabitants) was shorter than the period after the turning point. However, by varying the periods to which the models were fitted, Borsos et al. were nevertheless able to show that the underlying trends were not the same before and after the turning point. (2013) In a mainly methodological paper, Commandeur et al. (2013) argue for using statespace time-series models when analysing long-term trends in road safety. Examples are given of such analyses, showing that state-space models fit the data considerably better than other models. However, the assumption made in state-space models that residuals are normally distributed can be problematic in samples characterised by a low mean number of accidents per unit of time, as shown in the paper by Quddus Neither of the studies reviewed above make the same bold claim as Oppe did about the inevitability of the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities. Some of the recent studies include tests of the stability of trends in the form of predictions made for years that were not included when developing the models. From a logical point of view, this is the best way of testing the stability of trends, since the outcome could be both a confirmation (past trends accurately predict future outcomes) and a falsification (past trends do not accurately predict future outcomes) of the stability of trends.
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DATA AND METHODS
Data on traffic fatalities and vehicle kilometres (in the United States: miles) of travel were collected for six countries: Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. These countries were selected because data on traffic volume was available at least back to about 1950. To reliably estimate trends before the turning point, one needs about 20 years of data before this point was reached. To avoid the extraordinary conditions during World War II, the period analysed did not start before 1948 in any of the countries. The years included were 1952 -2013 for Norway, 1950 -2012 for Denmark and Sweden, 1948 -2010 for the Netherlands, 1949 -2011 for Great Britain, and 1948 -2012 for the United States. Data on traffic fatalities and traffic volume were taken from official statistics published in each country. For Denmark, these data were kindly provided by Stig Hemdorff at the national road directorate.
The approach taken to analysis is explained using Norway as a case. Next, the annual changes in fatality rate (fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres) were modelled based on data for 1952-1970. Only functions that do not have turning points were tested, as it is highly unlikely that the long-term trend in fatality rate would have any turning points that could be meaningfully interpreted, or that would not lead to absurd predictions if extrapolated. An exponential model was once again found to best fit the data (R-squared = 0.76). It was extrapolated to the years 1971-2013. By multiplying the model-predicted annual traffic volume by the modelpredicted fatality rate, an annual predicted number of fatalities was produced.
The analysis was then repeated using data for all years (1953-2013 for traffic growth, 1952-2013 for fatality rate). Traffic growth was found to be adequately modelled by a logarithmic function (R-squared = 0.70). A quadratic function (second degree polynomial) fitted slightly better, but was rejected because an extrapolation of it produced nonsensical predictions. The trend in fatality rate was very well described by an exponential function (R-squared = 0.98). Figure 2 shows model predictions. It seems clear, therefore, that if the trends before 1970 had continued after that year, the number of traffic fatalities in Norway would have been considerably higher than it actually turned out to be. A comparison of the two models shows that the longterm trends did change from before to after the turning point. Figure 3 shows the two models for traffic growth. There was thus a more rapid growth in traffic in Norway after 1970 than the declining trend in traffic growth before that year would lead one to predict. A larger traffic volume is, ceteris paribus, associated with a higher number of traffic fatalities.
However, since the number of traffic fatalities in Norway after 1970 was considerably lower than predicted by the model based on pre-1970 data, the longterm trend in fatality rate must also have changed. Figure 4 examines the trend in fatality rate.
Figure 4 about here
According to the model fitted to data for 1952-1970, fatality rate declined by 2.8 percent per year. According to the model fitted to data for 1952-2013, fatality rate declined by 5.0 percent per year. It is therefore clear that fatality rate declined more rapidly after 1970 than before 1970. An estimate for the period 1970-2013 indicates an annual decline in fatality rate of 5.2 percent. There was thus a change in the underlying trend, and this has contributed to the reduction of traffic fatalities in Norway after 1970. Note that the year 1970 was included in both models (1952-1970 and 1970-2013) .
RESULTS
Analyses identical to the one presented for Norway above were made for Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. Figure 5 presents the results for Denmark. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, the annual percentage decline in fatality rate in Sweden after the turning point appears to be smaller than before the turning point. There is, in that sense, no support for the idea that road safety policy became more effective after the turning point than it was before. The turning point was predictable from trends established before it was reached, and there has been a slower decline in traffic fatalities after the turning point than predicted on the basis of pre-turning point trends. Yet, both models fit the data rather poorly as indicated by the systematic prediction errors found in Figure 6 .
For the Netherlands, results of the analyses are shown in Figure 7 . 
Figure 8 about here
Pre-turning point trends gave no hint of a turning point. On the contrary, an extrapolation of these trends shows an accelerating growth in the number of traffic fatalities. Traffic growth in the period before the turning point was very irregular and no good model could be fitted to it. A logarithmic model was adopted (R 2 = 0.05).
Fatality rate declined by 4.3 percent per year before the turning point (R 2 = 0.97).
A model fitted to data for the entire period shows a turning point in 1971 at 6672 fatalities. Although the general shape of this model is consistent with actual development, it does not fit the data well. It has a turning point which is both later than the actual turning point and occurs at a lower number of fatalities than the actual turning point. Nevertheless, the rate of improvement of road safety in Great Britain has been greater after the turning point than before. In that sense, the turning point was a real change, not simply a continuation of pre-turning point trends.
The last country to be examined is the United States. Figure 9 shows results for the United States.
Figure 9 about here
The overall pattern is very similar to that found for Great Britain. Pre-turning point trends did not predict a turning point. A second degree polynomial best fitted preturning point traffic growth; however it made absurd predictions when extrapolated.
A power model was therefore preferred (R 2 = 0.09). Fatality rate declined by 1.9
percent per year (R 2 = 0.81) before the turning point was reached.
A model fitted to data for the entire period did, as expected, have a turning point. This occurred in 1981 at 49,192 fatalities. The real turning point was in 1972 at 55,600 fatalities. Thus, the model based on data for the entire period did not fit the data well. At any rate, comparison of the two models clearly indicates that a change in underlying trends took place from before to after the turning point. The declining trend in traffic fatalities after the turning point is, however, much weaker in the United States than in the other countries included in this study. Table 1 brings together the results for all countries with respect to the long-term trend in fatality rate. Fatality rate is, arguably, the best indicator of road safety performance, since road safety policy principally seeks to influence fatality rate rather than traffic volume per se. Thus, safety performance is improved if the annual reduction of fatality rate becomes greater.
Table 1 about here
In four of the six countries, the annual percentage reduction of fatality rate was greater after the turning point than before. In two countries, Denmark and Sweden, the annual percentage reduction of fatality rate was smaller after the turning point than before.
DISCUSSION
The models developed and discussed above are very simple, indeed so simple that it seems obvious that they will not fit the data very well. Yet, the models that were developed by Oppe about 25 years ago were almost as simple as the models presented here, differing principally by the fact that Oppe assumed a logistic function for traffic growth, i.e., a function which was flat at the beginning, then grew more steeply, then flattened out again. What, then, is the point of developing and discussing these simple models?
The main reason for revisiting models of the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities is that the models that were developed by Oppe have been misinterpreted by both himself and others. These models have been invoked to argue that there was no real turning point in the number of traffic fatalities, merely a continuation of trends implying that, sooner or later, a turning point would be reached. It is, however, obvious that a turning point follows when you fit the model to data for years both before and after the turning point occurred. Any reasonably well-fitting model will then reproduce the turning point found in the data used to fit the model. To determine if the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities follows with necessity from stable underlying trends, one must estimate these trends on the basis of data referring to the period before the turning point occurred. If a projection of the trend fitted by a model shows a turning point, ideally speaking one closely reproducing the actual turning point, one may conclude that the trends have remained stable and nothing fundamental has changed. If this is not the case, the turning point is not simply the result of stable underlying trends.
For the six countries included in this study, pre-turning point trends extrapolated to future years indicated a turning point in four of the countries, but this turning point occurred much later than the actual turning point in three of the countries. For the remaining two countries, an extrapolation of pre-turning point trends gave no hint of a future turning point. It therefore seems clear that the underlying trends are not stable. Clearly, these trends changed around the time of the turning point in the number of traffic fatalities, and may have changed again one or more times after the turning point was passed. It is undoubtedly possible to fit more sophisticated models to the data that will reproduce even short-term changes in underlying trends more precisely than the very simple models discussed in this paper -see for example the concise presentation of state-space time series analysis in a SWOV Fact sheet (SWOV 2013). However, the purpose of this paper was not to develop models that fit the data very well. It was simply to point out the fact that models need to be empirically testable to support any conclusions about long-term trends based on the models. Models are tested by using them to predict data that did not serve as the basis for developing the model. If the models predict the data well, they are verified and general conclusions can be drawn from them. If the models do not predict the data well, they are falsified and give, at best, only a locally valid historical description of the data that served as the basis for developing them and have no general validity outside the range of these data. This paper does not try to explain why the long-term trends changed in many countries around 1970. It is, however, not unreasonable to suggest that the changes are related to changes in road safety policy. In the United States, things started happening with Ralph Nader's book "Unsafe at any speed" in 1965 and the creation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, headed by William Haddon, in 1966. It was not until 1973/74, however, that there was a major drop in traffic fatalities in the US, as a response to the energy crisis and the national 55 MPH speed limit imposed to conserve energy.
In Sweden, the change to right-hand driving in 1967 was an impetus for more effective road safety policies. In Great Britain, the introduction of the blood alcohol limit in 1967 was an important initiative. In Denmark, like the US, the energy crisis in 1973-74 lead to the introduction of speed limits. As for Norway, the country had a Minister of Transport during 1971-72 who took a particular interest in road safety and brought it higher on the agenda than it had been before.
On the whole, therefore, road safety policies changed in many countries around 1970. It is likely that this gave a major contribution to the change in trend. On the other hand, evaluating the exact contribution of policy changes in any rigorous manner is difficult, if not impossible.
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions from the study presented in this paper is that, for five of the six developed countries that were included, a real turning point in the underlying trends determining the number of traffic fatalities appears to have occurred at about the time when the number of traffic fatalities reached its all-time peak level. In four of the countries, the annual decline in fatality rate was greater after the turning point than before. In the Denmark and Sweden, it was, surprisingly, smaller.
Although only six countries were included in this study, it is well-known that the number of traffic fatalities has been greatly reduced in many other countries. The main lessons are therefore that: (1) A country does not at any time have an "optimal" or "acceptable" number of traffic fatalities; 
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